Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 LISBON 07433 01 OF 03 261108Z
ACTION SS-14

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 IO-06 EUR-08 ARA-10 NSC-05 INR-05
CIAE-00 SP-02 AF-04 PM-03 DODE-00 PRS-01 /059 W
----------025119 261128Z /12
P 260848Z SEP 77
FM AMEMBASSY LISBON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3165
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 LISBON 7433

LIMDIS

USUN FOR SECRETARY'S BILATERAL WITH FONMIN SEPT 27
DEPT PASS OTHER POSTS AS DESIRED

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINT, PO, AO, US, PDIP
SUBJ: GOP ASSESSMENT OF ANGOLA SITUATION

SUMMARY: MINISTER WITHOUT PORTFOLIO CAMPINOS AND SECRETARY OF STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS ALEGRE, BOTH RECENT VISITORS TO ANGOLA, TOLD ME GOP BELIEVED ONLY POSSIBLE WESTERN POLICY TOWARD ANGOLA IS TOTAL SUPPORT FOR NETO WITH A VIEW TOWARD EVENTUAL RECONCILIATION BETWEEN THE MPLA AND UNITA. UNITA CAN CARRY ON INDEFINITE GUERRILLA WARFARE BUT CANNOT GAIN POWER. WITHOUT WESTERN SUPPORT NETO WILL EITHER BECOME A VIRTUAL PRISONER OF THE CUBANS OR VICTIM OF A SUCCESSFUL COUP ATTEMPT. NETO IS ANXIOUS TO REDUCE HIS DEPENDENCE ON THE SOVIETS AND CUBANS, AND IS TURNING TO PORTUGAL FOR SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE. THE GOP IS DISPOSED TO HELP BUT WANTS FIRST TO COORDINATE ITS POLICIES WITH THE WEST, PARTICULARLY THE U.S. THE SOVIETS WILL BE VERY DIFFICULT TO DISLODGE BUT IF THE WEST, ESPECIALLY PORTUGAL, DOESN'T MAKE ANY MORE MISTAKES, PRAGMATIC AFRICAN NATIONALISM WILL EVENTUALLY ASSERT ITSELF AND LEAD TO A REDUCTION OF
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 LISBON 07433 01 OF 03 261108Z

SOVIET-CUBAN INFLUENCE. THE U.S. IS STILL LOOKED UPON WITH SUSPICION -- AFTER FRANCE AND THE FRG -- BUT THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION'S AFRICAN POLICIES ARE BEGINNING TO CHANGE THE U.S. IMAGE. NEVERTHELESS THE U.S. MUST CONTINUE FOR A WHILE TO PLAY A BACKSTAGE ROLE IN ANGOLA.

1. ON SEPTEMBER 23 I HAD LENGTHY DISCUSSION ON ANGOLA WITH

Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009

Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009

MINISTER WITHOUT PORTOFOLIO CAMPINOS AND SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS ALEGRE. AS DEPARTMENT AWARE ALEGRE,
WHO IS CLOSE PERSONAL FRIEND OF NETO, RECENTLY VISITED
ANGOLA AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PORTUGUESE SOCIALIST PARTY.
CAMPINOS WAS PORTUGUESE DELEGATE ON SOCIALIST
INTERNATIONAL MISSION TO SOUTHERN AFRICA HEADED BY OLAF
PALME. BOTH HAD BEEN TOLD BY SOARES THAT THEY SHOULD BE
COMPLETELY FORTHCOMING WITH THE USG.

2. THE POWER BALANCE: CAMPINOS AND ALEGRE DO NOT ENVISAGE
ANY DRAMATIC CHANGES IN THE ANGOLAN MILITARY SITUATION. UNITA
UNQUESTIONABLY HAS THE CAPACITY TO CONTINUE WITH INDEFINITE
GUERRILLA WARFARE. BUT THE MPLA HAS FIRM CONTROL OF THE
CITIES, AND UNITA HAS NO CHANCE OF OVERTHROWING THE MPLA AS
LONG AS THE CUBANS CONTINUE THEIR SUPPORT. THE FNLA IS A
SPENT FORCE. WHILE THE FNLA SOLDIERS ARE GOOD, THE OFFICERS
ARE CORRUPT AND UNDISCIPLINED. THE MPLA, HOWEVER, HAS
RELATIVELY GOOD OFFICERS, WHO ARE BEING TRAINED BY THE
SOVIETS. THEIR SOLIDERS, ON THE OTHER HAND, ARE POOR.

3. THE POWER STRUCTURE -- SHAKY: NETO IS STILL IN CHARGE BUT
HIS POSITION IS PRECARIOUS. HIS MULATTO GOVERNMENT IS
VULNERABLE TO EXPLOITATION OF THE BLACK NATIONALISM THAT
EXISTS PARTICULARLY IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD AREAS AND IN THE MILI-
TARY. WHILE THE COUP ATTEMPT ELIMINATED THE IMMEDIATE OPPOSITION
LEADERSHIP IT ALSO MADE HIM MORE DEPENDENT ON FOREIGN COM-
SECRET

SECRET

MUNISTS. CUBAN ADVISORS PERVADE THE MINISTRIES, AND THE
SOVIETS ARE HEAVILY INVOLVED IN TRAINING THE MILITARY.
IF NETO DOESN'T RECEIVE SOME WESTERN SUPPORT VERY SOON, ONE OF
TWO THINGS WILL HAPPEN. HE WILL EITHER BECOME A VIRTUAL
PRISONER OF THE SOVIETS/CUBANS OR HE WILL BECOME THE VICTIM
OF A SUCCESSFUL COUP ATTEMPT BY RADICAL ELEMENTS. ALEGRE
COMMENTED ON THE HEAVY SECURITY GUARD AROUND NETO,
INCLUDING A SOLIDER WHO GUARDED NETO'S DOOR AS HE NAPPED ON
A YACHT WHOSE OTHER PASSENGERS INCLUDED ONLY ALEGRE AND NETO'S
CLOSEST ADVISORS.

4. DESIRE TO REDUCE DEPENDENCE ON SOVIETS: ASKED IF NETO
AND HIS CLOSE ASSOCIATES REALLY WANTED TO FREE THEMSELVES
FROM THE ALL-PERVASIVE SOVIET INFLUENCE, BOTH ALEGRE AND
CAMPINOS RESPONDED AFFIRMATIVELY. CAMPINOS NOTED THAT WHILE
NETO IS A MARXIST, HE IS ALSO A PRAGMATIST AND RECOGNIZES
THE DANGERS OF THE SOVIET PRESENCE. ALEGRE SAID THAT WHILE HE
WAS CRUISING WITH NETO ON A YACHT, THE LATTER POINTED TO A SOVIET

SECRET

Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009

Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 LISBON 07433 02 OF 03 261118Z
ACTION SS-14

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 IO-06 EUR-08 ARA-10 NSC-05 INR-05
CIAE-00 SP-02 AF-04 PM-03 DODE-00 PRS-01 /059 W
----------025194 261127Z /12
P 260848Z SEP 77
FM AMEMBASSY LISBON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3166
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 3 LISBON 7433

LIMDIS

FISHING TRAWLER AND COMMENTED BITTERLY THAT SOVIET POLICY
TOWARD ANGOLA WAS ONE OF "PILLAGE".

5. DISTRUST OF PORTUGUESE COMMUNIST PARTY: ALEGRE SAID THAT
AS A RESULT OF THE COUP ATTEMPT THE PCP HAD LOST VIRTUALLY
ALL ITS INFLUENCE WITH THE MPLA. THE MPLA CLEARLY BELIEVES
THAT THE COUP WAS INSTIGATED BY THE PCP. THE PRINCIPAL
PCP AGENT WAS CITA VALLES, WHO IS UNDER ARREST AND WILL
PROBABLY BE EXECUTED WITHOUT TRIAL. ALSO IMPLICATED IS
FORMER PORTUGUESE LABOR MINISTER COSTA MARTINS. ALEGRE
MADE A HALFHEARTED ATTEMPT TO GET HIM RELEASED, BUT WAS TOLD
ABSOLUTELY NO BY NETO. ALEGRE THINKS COSTA MARTINS WILL
AT LEAST GET A TRIAL. THE MPLA WAS SO INFURIATED BY THE PCP
INVOLVEMENT IN THE COUP ATTEMPT THAT IT HAD PREPARED A
PUBLIC STATEMENT DENOUNCING THE PCP. ONLY AT THE LAST
MINUTE DID THEY DECIDE NOT TO ISSUE IT. THE INVITATION TO
MARIO SOARES TO VISIT ANGOLA IN HIS CAPACITY AS SYG OF THE
SOCIALIST PARTY IS A CLEAR SIGNAL THAT THE MPLA WISHES TO
DEEMPHASIZE ITS RELATIONS WITH THE PCP AND STRENGTHEN ITS
CONTACTS WITH THE SOCIALISTS. THE INVITATION TO SOARES
CAME PERSONALLY FROM NETO.

6. SOVIET-CUBAN ROLE: THE ANGOLANS ARE NOT QUITE CERTAIN
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 LISBON 07433 02 OF 03 261118Z

WHAT HAPPENED ON MAY 27, BUT THEY ARE INCLINED TO BELIEVE
THAT SOME SORT OF CONFLICT AROSE BETWEEN THE SOVIETS AND
THE CUBANS. THEY ARE CONVINCED THAT THE SOVIETS WERE PLAYING

Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009

Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009

BOTH SIDES AND DECIDED TO SUPPORT NITO ALVES WHEN NETO BEGAN
SHOWING SIGNS OF INDEPENDENCE. BUT WHEN THE COUP WAS TRIGGERED
PREMATURELY, THEY SOON REALIZED IT HAD NO CHANCE OF SUCCESS
AND WITHDREW. THE FACT THAT THE CUBANS STEPPED IN MEANS THAT
THEY PROBABLY DIDN'T GET THE WORD.

7. ATTITUDES TOWARD THE WEST: WHILE NETO IS ANXIOUS TO
REDUCE HIS DEPENDENCE ON THE EAST, BOTH ALEGRE AND CAMPINOS
FOUND THE MPLA STILL WARY OF THE WEST. THEY WERE EXTREMELY
DISTRUSTFUL OF FRANCE, THE FRG, AND THE U.S. IN THAT ORDER.
BUT THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION POLICIES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA
WERE VIEWED FAVORABLY AND WERE HAVING A GOOD IMPACT ON
THE U.S. IMAGE. AMBASSADOR YOUNG IN PARTICULAR WAS HELD
IN HIGH ESTEEM. ALEGRE CARRIED A PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM
SOARES TO NETO TO THE EFFECT THAT SOARES HAD GREAT CONFIDENCE
IN THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION. NETO HAD RESPONDED POSITIVELY
TO THIS. CAMPINOS SAID PALME HAD ASKED NETO ABOUT WHETHER
HE HAD HEARD ANYTHING RECENTLY FROM THE AMERICANS. NETO RESPONDED
IN THE NEGATIVE. PALME THEN PROVIDED A FAVORABLE DESCRIPTION
OF THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION'S AFRICAN POLICIES.

8. U.S. RECOGNITION: I ASKED WHETHER THEY THOUGHT WE OUGHT
TO DO ANYTHING ON THE RECOGNITION ISSUE. BOTH CAMPINOS AND
ALEGRE HESITATED AND THEN CONCLUDED THAT IT WOULD PROBABLY
BE BEST FOR THE U.S. TO HOLD OFF FOR A WHILE. THE SITUATION
WAS EXTREMELY DELICATE AND THERE WAS VERY LITTLE THE U.S.
COULD DO DIRECTLY. THE BEST THING THAT COULD BE DONE WOULD
BE FOR THE U.S. TO COORDINATE ITS POLICIES AND TO OPERATE
THROUGH COUNTRIES SUCH AS ITALY AND PORTUGAL WHICH STILL HAD
SOME CREDIT WITH THE MPLA.
SECRET

SECRET

9. REQUEST FOR GOP ASSISTANCE: NETO HAD REQUESTED GOP
ASSISTANCE IN HIS MEETINGS WITH BOTH CAMPINOS AND ALEGRE.
HIS PRIMARY EMPHASIS HAD BEEN ON MILITARY AID. HIS GOVERNMENT
NEEDED AMMUNITION FOR G3'S AND MEDICAL SUPPLIES IN PARTICULAR.
HE ASKED IF A FACTORY PRODUCING MEDICAL SUPPLIES COULD BE
ESTABLISHED IN ANGOLA. ALSO DISCUSSED WERE MILITARY TRAINING
PROGRAMS, PARTICULARLY PILOT TRAINING. ALEGRE SAID THE
GPRA WAS INTERESTED IN RECEIVING EQUIPMENT THAT PORTUGAL
HAD USED DURING THE AFRICA CAMPAIGN. CAMPINOS DESCRIBED IN
DETAIL THE ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT'S DESPERATE NEEDS IN THE
TRANSPORTATION AREA, NOTING THAT THERE EXISTED A SEVERE
SHORTAGE OF TRUCK DRIVERS AND GROSS DEFICIENCIES IN RAIL
TRANSPORT. THE GOP WAS IN A UNIQUE POSITION TO DEVELOP
TRANSPORTATION PROJECTS FOR THE ANGOLANS AND PROVIDE THE
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO IMPLEMENT THEM. ALSO IMPORTANT
TO THE ANGOLANS WAS THE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PORTUGAL COULD
PROVIDE IN SUCH AREAS AS EDUCATION AND HEALTH. THESE

Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009

Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009

AREAS WERE DOMINATED BY THE CZECHS AND THE CUBANS, BUT NEITHER
HAD BEEN EFFECTIVE. THE ANGOLANS WERE ANXIOUS TO HAVE THE
REFUGEES RETURN TO FILL SOME OF THESE VOIDS, BUT
THIS WOULD REQUIRE DISCREET NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO
COUNTRIES ON UNRESOLVED ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, PARTICULARLY THE
ISSUE OF COMPENSATION.

10. GOP POLICY: ALEGRE AND CAMPINOS BOTH FELT THAT, TO

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 LISBON 07433 03 OF 03 261116Z
ACTION SS-14

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 IO-06 EUR-08 ARA-10 NSC-05 INR-05
CIAE-00 SP-02 AF-04 PM-03 DODE-00 PRS-01 /059 W
----------025177 261127Z /12
P 260848Z SEP 77
FM AMEMBASSY LISBON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3167
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 3 LISBON 7433

LIMDIS

THE DEGREE THE GOP COULD PROVIDE ASSISTANCE, NETO WOULD BECOME
LESS DEPENDENT ON THE SOVIETS AND THE CUBANS. THEY SAW NO
ALTERNATIVE TO ALL-OUT SUPPORT FOR NETO. IF UNITA HAD A
CHANCE OF WINNING, SUPPORT FOR THEM MIGHT BE A VIABLE POLICY,
BUT NO SUCH CHANCE EXISTED. IF MATTERS ARE ALLOWED TO
DRIFT, NETO WILL FALL OR BECOME IMMOBILIZED, AND MORE
RADICAL ELEMENTS WILL TAKE HIS PLACE. THEY EMPHASIZED
REPEATEDLY, HOWEVER, THAT THE GOP DID NOT WISH TO DEVELOP
ITS POLICY IN ISOLATION. PORTUGAL DID NOT HAVE EITHER THE
INTERNATIONAL STANDING OR THE RESOURCES TO MOVE ON ITS OWN.
A SUCCESSFUL ANGOLAN POLICY COULD BE IMPLEMENTED ONLY IN
COORDINATION WITH PORTUGAL'S WESTERN ALLIES, PARTICULARLY
THE UNITED STATES. THIS POLICY, AS THEY SAW IT, WOULD
ENTAIL PROVIDING ALL POSSIBLE ASSISTANCE TO NETO AND SLOWLY
WORKING TOWARD A GRADUAL RECONCILIATION BETWEEN THE MPLA
AND UNITA. CONSIDERABLE SKILL AND PATIENCE WOULD BE
REQUIRED. THE SOVIETS WERE SOLIDLY ENTRENCHED IN ANGOLA AND
WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO DISLODGE. BUT THEY DID NOT UNDERSTAND
THE AFRICANS. CULTURAL BONDS BETWEEN PORTUGAL AND THE
ANGOLANS REMAINED STRONG. THE WEST, PARTICULARLY PORTUGAL,

Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009

Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009

HAD MADE A MISTAKE IN CUTTING POLITICAL TIES WITH THE MPLA,
BUT THESE WERE NOW BEING REBUILT. THE AFRICANS CHERISHED
THEIR NEWLY WON INDEPENDENCE AND NATIONALIST FORCES WOULD
SECRET

SECRET

ASSERT THEMSELVES IN ANGOLA GIVEN HALF A CHANCE. THE WEST,
PARTICULARLY PORTUGAL, HAD TO AVOID REPEATING PAST ERRORS IF
WE WISH TO HELP THOSE FORCES MOVE ANGOLA TO A MORE NEUTRAL
POSITION. IF WE DO NOT ACT SKILLFULLY AND IN CONCERT, THE
SITUATION COULD WORSEN CONSIDERABLY.

11. COMMENT: I TOLD CAMPINOS AND ALEGRE I WOULD REPORT
THEIR VIEWS TO WASHINGTON, AND CONVEY TO THEM THE DEPARTMENT'S
REACTIONS.
CARLUCCI

SECRET

NNN

Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS, POLITICAL SITUATION, POLITICAL SUMMARIES, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION, LIBERATION FRONTS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 26-Sep-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 22 May 2009
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977LISBON07433
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: DG ALTERED PER 77 LISBON 7514
Executive Order: X3
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: P770152-2068, D770349-0793
Format: TEL
From: LISBON
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t19770922/aaaaasrx.tel
Line Count: 297
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 3bb72a3e-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: LIMDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 6
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: LIMDIS
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 17-Feb-2005 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 1136760
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: GOP ASSESSMENT OF ANGOLA SITUATION
TAGS: PINT, PDIP, PO, AO, US
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkvgwkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/3bb72a3e-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009